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TEBBE AND REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM 
ANDREW KOPPELMAN* 
The basic method of Nelson Tebbe’s fine book, “Religious 
Freedom in an Egalitarian Age,”1 is what John Rawls called 
“reflective equilibrium”.2  Rawls famously proposed a theory of 
justice that aimed to be “strictly deductive.”3 His deductions, 
however, take place within a larger account of justification that 
he calls “reflective equilibrium,” in which we try to bring our 
considered moral judgments into line with our more general 
principles.4  “A conception of justice cannot be deduced from self-
evident premises or conditions on principles; instead, its 
justification is the matter of the mutual support of many 
considerations, of everything fitting together into one coherent 
view.”5 Any general theory must be consistent with the specific 
judgments in which we have the greatest confidence, such as our 
judgments “that religious intolerance and racial discrimination 
are unjust.”6 These are “provisional fixed points [into] which we 
presume any conception of justice must fit.”7 The deduction, in 
short, does not always go in one direction.  “It is a mistake to 
 
 *John Paul Stevens Professor of Law and Professor (by courtesy) of Political Science, 
Department of Philosophy Affiliated Faculty, Northwestern University.  Thanks to Nelson 
Tebbe for helpful comments on an earlier draft. 
1 NELSON TEBBE, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AN EGALITARIAN AGE (2017) [hereinafter 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM]. 
2 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 18 (revised ed. 1999)[hereinafter A THEORY OF 
JUSTICE]. 
3 Id. at 103. 
4 Id. at 18. 
5 Id. at 19. 
6 Id. at 17. 
7 A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 18.  
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think of abstract conceptions and general principles as always 
overriding [] more particular judgments.”8   
Tebbe proposes to use this method to address the hotly debated 
question of religious exemptions from anti-discrimination law. 
His book is a thoughtful and scrupulous treatment of the 
problem, and Tebbe’s judgments are generally sound.9 
One attraction of reflective equilibrium is its correspondence 
with common sense. People already reason about moral problems 
in just this way. For that reason, however, these chapters are 
unnecessary. There are two kinds of skeptic:  those who think 
that warranted outcomes are impossible10 and those who think 
that no theory of religious liberty is possible and that we can only 
defend particular prudential judgments.  The first group is a 
familiar kind of undergraduate wiseass who does not really 
believe what he is saying and is just having fun with you: I can 
prove that you do not exist, etc.  Even if one wishes to engage 
with such people, there is nothing about this argument that has 
any specific implications for religious liberty. As for the second 
group, they are perfectly happy to fight with you about particular 
judgments of what to do in specific situations. So they can engage 
with the later chapters of Tebbe’s book without ever talking 
about Chapters One and Two. The book would have been better 
without its first two chapters. 
Here, I will focus on a deep tension between Tebbe’s devotion 
to reflective equilibrium and his conviction, stated at many 
points in the book, that “it is no longer clear that constitutional 
law should treat religious belief as special, as compared to 
nonreligious beliefs or non-belief.”11 In this, Tebbe joins a 
growing number of scholars who doubt that special treatment for 
religion is justified.12  The problem is, as Tebbe admits a few 
 
8 JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 45 (1993)[hereinafter POLITICAL LIBERALISM]. 
9 I have a somewhat different take on the gay rights/religious liberty conflict, which I 
will not review here. See Andrew Koppelman, Gay Rights, Religious Accommodations, and 
the Purposes of Antidiscrimination Law, 88 S. Cal. L. Rev. 619 (2015)(discussing 
accommodation laws and several state laws and observing the American sentiment 
towards religious objection); see also Andrew Koppelman, A Free Speech Response to the 
Gay Rights/Religious Liberty Conflict, 110 NW U. L. Rev. 1125 (2016)(discussing the 
tensions between Free Speech and Anti-Discrimination Laws). 
10 RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 1, at 31. 
11 Id. at 4—5.  
12 For discussions of the increasing number of scholars who are persuaded of this 
objection, see KATHLEEN BRADY, THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF RELIGION IN AMERICAN LAW: 
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pages later, that “religious freedom itself is a foundational 
value.”13 It is hard coherently to have religious freedom without 
religion. 
Let us be clear about the settled practices that are the 
background of Tebbe’s work. First Amendment doctrine has used 
“neutrality” as one of its master concepts, but it treats religion as 
a good thing. Religious conscientious objectors are often 
accommodated. Disestablishment protects religion from 
manipulation by the state.14 The law’s neutrality is its insistence 
that religion’s goodness be understood at a high enough level of 
abstraction that the state takes no position on any live religious 
dispute.15 America, the most religiously diverse nation on earth, 
has been unusually successful in dealing with its diversity.16   
American legal theorists have proposed a lot of substitutes for 
“religion.” Conscience is probably the most popular.17 The shift 
away from religion reflects the influence of a tendency in 
contemporary political theory, commonly called liberal neutrality 
(very different from American religious neutrality, which treats 
religion as a good) that claims that state action should never be 
justified on the basis of any contested conception of the good.   
Tebbe seems to be drawn to liberal neutrality. He constantly 
worries about unfairness to the nonreligious, even when those 
people do not exist.  (For instance, there is, or more precisely 
isn’t, Schmelaine Photography, a nonreligious equivalent of 
Elane Photography, the New Mexico wedding photographer.)18 In 
his view, the establishment clause becomes about equal 
citizenship, because religious minorities become “disfavored 
members of the political community.”19 
 
RETHINKING RELIGION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 17—55 (2015); see also ANDREW 
KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY 120—65 (2013) [hereinafter 
AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY]. 
13 RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 1, at 12. 
14 AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY, supra note 12, at 10. 
15 Id. at 2.  
16 Id. at 1. 
17 See Andrew Koppelman, Conscience, Volitional Necessity, and Religious 
Exemptions, 15 LEGAL THEORY 215 (2009) (discussing scholars who are drawn to this 
substitute). 
18 RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 1, at 86, 89, 91. 
19 Nelson Tebbe, Government Nonendorsement, 98 MINN. L. REV. 648, 659-60 (2013). 
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Religion matters for Tebbe, because it is a socially significant 
characteristic of one’s identity.20  There are lots of such 
characteristics. “Racist” comes to mind. He wants to 
accommodate comparable “deep and worthy secular 
commitments of conscience,”21 but it is not clear that these are 
detectable.  How can the state know “where a secular need really 
is comparatively pressing and principled”?22 
Equality certainly was a theme of disestablishment from the 
beginning: Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance complained 
that subsidy for religion “violates that equality which ought to be 
the basis of every law.”23 But an equally important concern was 
protecting religion from corrupting manipulation by the 
government.24 That disappears from Tebbe’s analysis. 
The denial that religion is special leads Tebbe to want to 
recharacterize the ministerial exception to anti-discrimination 
law as freedom of association, which applies only to membership 
requirements that are related to a group’s message.25 This, he 
acknowledges, “may require courts to inquire into the belief 
systems of faiths.”26 Courts thus would have to entertain the 
possibility that, for example, the Vatican has gotten Catholic 
ecclesiology wrong. That might not be troubling from the 
perspective of liberal neutrality, which would treat religion like 
any other ideology, but it is a big problem if the establishment 
clause aims to keep state actors from making theological 
pronouncements. That is why the Supreme Court rejected the old 
“departure from doctrine” principle, which awarded property to 
the party in an intra-church dispute that maintained the 
church’s original doctrines.27 
 
20 See RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 2, at 85-86. 
21 Id. at 76.   
22 Id. at 79. 
23 JAMES MADISON, THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 82 (William T. Hutchinson et al. 
Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press eds., 2000). 
24 See Andrew Koppelman, Corruption of Religion and the Establishment Clause, 50 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1831 (2009) [hereinafter Corruption of Religion]. 
25 This is the prevailing law of freedom of association.  See ANDREW KOPPELMAN & 
TOBIAS BARRINGTON WOLFF, A RIGHT TO DISCRIMINATE? HOW THE CASE OF BOY SCOUTS 
OF AMERICA V. JAMES DALE WARPED THE LAW OF FREE ASSOCIATION (2009).  
26 RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 1, at 94. 
27 Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian 
Church, 393 U.S. 440, 450 (1969). 
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American law looks nothing like liberal neutrality, and it is not 
obvious that liberal neutrality’s implications are politically 
sustainable.  Drug policy, for instance, is indefensible without the 
judgment that certain uses of recreational drugs cut people off 
from good lives.28 
Now, it may be possible to defend the singling out of religion in 
terms that secularists could accept, by treating it as a workable 
proxy for values that the law cannot directly reach – conscience, 
or integrity, or whatever.29 But that will not change the fact that 
“religion” persists as an operational category.  The ministerial 
exception from anti-discrimination law, for instance, applies only 
to ministers.30  It is not an instance of a more general freedom of 
conscience. 
I doubt whether, if Tebbe changed his mind about this, it 
would affect his judgments about public accommodations, 
employment law, and so forth.  He clearly is ready to give some 
weight to the wishes of those who do not want to comply with 
anti-discrimination laws. What difference does it make how one 
describes those wishes? 
One advantage of the focus on religious liberty is that it makes 
clear just how deep the disagreement is that we are trying to 
cope with. America has long been a counterexample to 
Rousseau’s dictum that “it is impossible to live at peace with 
those whom one believes to be damned.”31  The same-sex 
marriage issue, in which one side loathes what the other holds 
holy, tests that proposition anew. 
One salient aspect of the current conflict is that religious 
conservatives fear being stamped out. The conservative 
columnist Rod Dreher describes an emerging consensus on the 
right “that the most important goal at this stage is not to stop 
 
28 See generally Andrew Koppelman, Drug Policy and the Liberal Self, 100 NW. U. L. 
REV. 279 (2006).  
29 See Andrew Koppelman, Nonexistent and Irreplaceable:  Keep the Religion in 
Religious Freedom, 142 COMMONWEAL (Mar. 27, 2015), 
https://www.commonwealmagazine.org/nonexistent-irreplaceable; Andrew Koppelman, 
Religion’s Specialized Specialness, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. Dialogue 71 (2012); Andrew 
Koppelman, “Religion” as a Bundle of Legal Proxies: Reply to Micah Schwartzman, 51 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 1079 (2014). 
30 Andrew Koppelman, ”Freedom of the Church” and the Authority of the State, 21 J. 
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 145, 145-146 (2013). 
31 JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 131 (Roger D. Masters ed. & 
Judith R. Masters trans., 1978). 
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gay marriage entirely but to secure as much liberty as possible 
for dissenting religious and social conservatives while there is 
still time.”32 They are right to be scared.   
At one point, Tebbe offers a worrying justification for tolerance: 
Governments may well be wise to stay their hand out of recognition 
that groups may need time to deliberate over rapid changes in social 
mores on questions like marriage equality and transgender inclusion.  
Decisions like Obergefell send a clear message of constitutional 
commitments on such questions, and private groups can be expected to 
respond over time.33 
This expectation is likely to be disappointed, at least with 
respect to some groups.  The Catholics, Mormons, Orthodox 
Jews, and Southern Baptists will not come around any time soon.  
Tolerance had best not depend on any prediction that they will. 
 
 
32 Rod Dreher, Does Faith = Hate?: Gay Marriage and Religious Liberty are Uneasy 
Bedfellows, AM. CONSERVATIVE (Oct. 9, 2013), 
http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/does-faith-hate/. 
33 RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 1, at 192. 
